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LEGISLATION-PERPETUITms-SoME RECENT STATUTORY CHANGES

LAw OF PERPETUITIEs1 -During the past five years2 the legislatures of several states have wrestled anew with an old problem, that
of limiting the permissible duration of indirect restraints upon the
alienation of property.8 Generally speaking, these statutes may be
grouped into two classes: those designed· to abandon previous statutory
modifications of the common law rule against perpetuities and return to
the common law rule; and those designed· to ·modify the common law
rule or alter existing statutory rules. With respect to the latter group, a
further classification is possible between statutes which attempt a general
revision of the law as to perpetuities and those which are aimed at
narrow and specific problems.
This comment will undertake an examination of these statutes for
the purposes of determining the legislative objectives, the extent to
which the statutes are likely to attain those objectives, and, to a limited
extent, the desirability of those objectives. Particular attention will be

IN THE

1 The writer is indebted to Professor Lewis M. Simes of the University of Michigan Law
School for his counsel during the preparation of this comment.
2 From 1945 through 1949.
a 2 S1MEs, Funnm INTERESTS §490 (1936).
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given to two statutes: the 1949 Michigan statute,4 designed to return
to the common law rule against perpetuities with respect to interests in
land and chattels real, and the 1947 Pennsylvania statute5 which attempts a general revision of the common law rule.·

I
Statutes Reinstating the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities
A. Michigan
Prior to 1846, the common law rule against perpetuities was in force
in Michigan. 6 In that year, the legislature adopted the statutory twolives rule against the suspension of the absolute power of alienation,
making it applicable, however, only to interests in land and chattels
real. 7 The common law rule, therefore, remained in force as to chattels
personal,8 and the resulting diversity was found to be unsatisfactory.9
Accordingly, in 1949, the Michigan legislature enacted a new statute,
having the expressly stated objective of restoring uniformity by again
rendering interests in land and chattels real subject to the common law
rule against perpetuities. The title and first section of the new statute
are as follows:
"AN AcT concerning perpetuities and the suspension of the
absolute power of alienation with respect to interests in real property, making uniform the law as to real and personal property;
and repealing sections 14, 15, 16, l 7, 18, 19, 20 and 23 of chapter
62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846, being sections 554.14, 554.15,
554.16, 554.17, 554.18, 554.19, 554.20 and 554.23, respectively,
of the Compiled Laws of 1948.
The People of the State of Michigan enact:
Sec. 1. The common law rule known as the rule against
perpetuities now in force in this state as to personal property shall
hereafter be applicable to real property and estates and other
interests therein, whether freehold or non-freehold, legal or equi4 Mich. Laws (1949), Act 38, 18 Mich. Stat. Ann. -0937, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
§§26.49(1), (2) and (3).
5 Pa. Laws (1947) H.B. 296, §§4, 5; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1940, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
tit. 20, §§301.4, 301.5.
6 St. Amourv. Rivard, 1 Gibbs (2 Mich.) 294 (1852).
7 Mich. Rev. Stat. (1846) c. 62, §§14-21 and 23.
8 Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924).
9 The Michigan Supreme Court held that a trust containing some $800 worth of real
property and personalty worth some $56,000 was wholly void since the trust violated the
statutory rule applicable to land. In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657
(1938). The court also confused the law regarding the statutory two-lives rule by declaring
that, for purposes of the two-lives limitation, children of the testator were but one life. Kemp

1160

MrcmGAN LAw REvrnw

[ Vol. 48

table, by way of trust or otherwise, thereby making uniform the
rule as to perpetuities applicable to real and personal property."10
The power of the legislature to enact such a statute, affecting as it
does only interests subsequently created,11 cannot be questioned. The
only questions which might possibly arise, therefore, are whether the
legislature complied with constitutional requirements regarding the
form of the legislation, and as to the meaning of the statutory language.
One requirement of the Michig~ Constitution regarding the form
of legislation is that every law enacted by the legislature must be limited to one object, which object must be stated in the title of the act.12
With respect to the one-object requirement, it seems clear that the st~tute complies. It is true that the statute repeals statutes dealing with
the suspension of the absolute power of alienation and enacts the common law rule against perpetuities, and that the Michigan Supreme
Court has declared that these two rules are distinct. 13 But it is hardly
reasonable to require the legislature to enact two statutes, one to repeal
the old law and the second to replace it with new law; Justice Cooley
has pointed out that this constitutional provision was not designed to
require such a multiplicity· of legislation, but was ·designed to prevent
log-rolling.14 Justice Cooley further laid down the proposition, since
v. Sutton, 233. Mich. 249, 206 N.W. 366 (1925). With respect to both of these problems,
see Long, "Perpetuities and Accumulations: Recent Legislative Acts Explained," 17 DETROIT
LAWYER 193 at 195 (1949).
10 Mich. Laws (1949) Act 38, §1, 18 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
§26.49(1). The second and third sections of the statute read as follows:
"Sec. 2. Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 23 of chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes
of"1846, being sections 554.14, 554.15, 554.16, 554.17, 554.18, 554.19, 554.20 and 554.23,
respectively, of the Compiled laws of 1948, concerning perpetuities and the suspension of
the absolute power of alienation, are hereby repealed.
"Sec. 3. This act applies only to wills with respect to which the testator dies after the
effective date of this act and to deeds and other instruments executed after the effective date
of this act." Mich. Laws (1949) Act 38, §§2, 3, 18 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
§§26.49(2), (3).
11 Mich. Laws (1949) Act 38, §3, 18 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
§26.49(3). For the text of this provision, see note 10, supra.
12 "No law shall embrace more than 1 object, which shall ·be expressed in its title," Mi:cH.
CONST. (1908) Art. V., §21.
1s Michigan Trot Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924).
14 "But it is insisted that the.whole law is unconstitutional and void, because in violation
of section twenty of article four of the constitution, which provides that 'no law shall embrace
more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title.' The history and purpose of this
constitutional provision are too well understood to require any elucidation at our hands. The
practice of bringing together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature, and having no
necessary connection, with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all, and thus
secure the passage of several measures, no one of which could succeed upon its own merits,
was one both corruptive of the legislator and dangerous to the State.... Ther~ was no design
by this clause to embarrass legislation by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their scope
and operation, and thus multiplying their number••• .'' People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481
at 494-95 (1865). The case involved Art. IV, §20 of the Michigan Constitution of 1850.
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followed in the Michigan cases, that this constitutional requirement is
satisfied if a statute is confined to a single general object,1 5 and while
the common law rule and the statutory rule are distinct in the sense
that they measure the permissible duration of indirect restraints by
different standards,16 both are designed to deal with the problem of
perpetuities, that is, the problem of limiting the permissible duration
of indirect restraints upon the alienation of property.17 The foregoing
also disposes of a possible ,argument that several of the statutory sections18 repealed by the new Michigan statute do not deal with suspension of the power of alienation and therefore that their repeal gives the
statute multiple objects. These sections are concerned with restrictions
on the creation of estates for life, but are treated in the Restatement of
Property as a part of Michigan's statutory perpetuities plan.19
Another aspect of the Michigan constitutional provisions which we
have been considering is the requirement that the object of the statute
must be stated in the title thereof. 20 Justice Cooley points out that this
provision was designed to prevent the insertion of hidden provisions,
thereby securing the approval of legislation which the majority would
15 " ••• the framers of the constitution meant to put an end to legislation of the vicious
character referred to .•. and to require that in every case the proposed measure should stand
upon its own merits ..•. But this purpose is fully accomplished when the law has but one
general object, which is fairly indicated by its title. To require that every end and means
necessary to the accomplishment of this general object should be provided for by a separate
act relating to that alone, would not only be senseless, but would actually render legislation
impossible." People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 at 495 (1865). This case involved Art. IV.,
§20 of the Michigan Constitution of 1850 which contained the same provision in this regard
as Art. V., §21 of the present Michigan Constitution of 1908. For cases supporting the test
suggested by Justice Cooley see the following: Atty. Gen. v. Weimer, 59 Mich. 580 at 587-88,
26 N.W. 773 (1886) (this case also deals with Art. IV, §20 of the Michigan Constitution of
1850); Atty. Gen. v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 273 Mich. 554 at 558-59, 263 N.W. 866
(1935).
16 The statutory test is, will there be, at the termination of two lives in being at the
creation of the interest, persons in being who can convey a fee simple. Mich. Rev. Stat.
(1846) c. 62, §§14, 15, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.14, 554.15. The common law
rule asks whether the contingent interest must vest, if at all, within lives in being and 21
years from the creation of the interest. GRAY, THE RuLB AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed.,
§201 (1915). For example, assume a conveyance from Oto those children of either A or B
who are living 25 years after the decease of the sw:vjvor of A and B. This interest is good
under the statutory rule since A and B are the two lives in being and their children who sw:vjve
them, together with the heirs of 0, can ·convey a fee simple even though no child of either
A or B is yet 25. But the interest is bad under the common law rule, for the minimum membership of the class need not be determined within the period of the rule, 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §§387, 388 (1940).
17 It will be observed that the Restatement of Property classifies these Michigan statutory provisions as creating a statutory rule against perpetuities, 4 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT,
Appendix on The Statutory Rules Against Perpetuities, c. B, 'i!'i!50-58 (1940).
18 Mich. Rev. Stat. (1846) c. 62, §§17-19, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.17-554.19.
19 4 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, Appendix on the Statutory Rules Against Perpetuities,
c. B, 'i!53 (1940).
20 MicH. CoNST. (1908) Art. V., §21. See note 12, supra, for the te.'l:t of this provision.
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not knowingly approve. 21 Viewed from this standpoint, it will be· seen
-that the title of the new Michigan statute, which carefully details the
matter dealt with in the body of the statute, complies with the constitutional requirement.
Turning from the subject of compliance with constitutional formalities to a consideration of the meaning of the new statute, we find the
legislative objective clearly spelled out, namely, to make the common
law rule against perpetuities uniformly applicable to both real and personal property. It seems clear that the statutory reference to "real
property and estates and interests therein, whether freehold or nonfreehold," makes the common law rule against perpetuities applicable
to leaseholds, the Michigan Supreme Court having held a lease to be a
<;:onveyance of an interest in real property. 22 It is true that the statute
makes no attempt to state the common law rule against perpetuities,
merely referring to "the common law rule against perpetuities now in
force in this state as to personal property," but the reason for this is
clear enough. The legislative objective is a uniform rule applicable
to real and personal property and any legislative attempt to state the
rule in detail would run the risk of deviation from the rule as applied
to personal property which has, developed through case law. Moreover,
any statute which attempted a complete statement of the common law
rule against perpetuities would be an exceedingly lengthy piece of
legislation. It should also be noted that the statute does not refer to the
common law rule "as now in force in this state as to personal property,"
hence the statute does not preclude the application of the common law
rule to interests in real property in situations in which no Michigan
case law has as yet been_ enunciated by the Gourts. The statutory reference to the common law rule "now in force in this state as to personal
property" was doubtless intended to emphasize the legislative objective
of uniformity.
It is interesting to note that, even were we to assume that the first
section of the new statute does not effectively restore the common law
21 After discussing the one-object requirement of the constitutional provision and explaining the reason for its existence, Justice Cooley refers to " ... another practice, also intended
to be remedied by this provision, by which, through dexterous management, clauses were inserted in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and their passage secured through legislative bodies whose members were not generally aware of their intention and effect." People v.
Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 at 495 (1865). This case involved Art. IV., §20 of the Michigan
Constitution of 1850 which contained the same language in this regard as Art. V., §21
of the present Michigan Constitution of 1908. For cases involving the present Michigan
Constitution, see the following: Loomis v. Rogers, 197 Mich. 265, 163 N;W. 1018 (1917);
Jacobson v. Carlson, 302 Mich. 448, 4 N.W. (2d) 721 (1942).
22 Pickalo v. Mack, 217 Mich. 274, 186 N.W. 502 (1922).
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rule against perpetuities as to interests in real property, the second
section,23 which repeals the pre-existing statutory law, should effectively accomplish that objective. This is so because of the following: prior
to 1846, Michigan recognized the common law rule with respect to
interests in real property;24 the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine that repeal of a statute re-instates pre-existing common
law;25 therefore the repeal of the 1846 statutes by the second section
-0f the new statute should re-instate the pre-existing common law rule as
to interests in real property.
·
As to the effect of the new statute on pre-existing legislation to
which the statute does not refer, two such statutes may be briefly mentioned. It is clear that the ~mployees' trust statute26 is not affected since
this statute only has reference to trusts of personal property. Nor does
it appear that the new statute. affects prior legislation dealing with
transfers to charity.27 This conclusion seems justified for two reasons:
first, the second section of the new statute lists those statutory provisions which are intended to be repealed and makes no reference to the
charitable transfer statutes,28 the fair inference being that the legislature listed those prior statutory provisions which were to be wholly
or partially repealed; second, the declared objective of the new statute
is to make the law of perpetuities uniform as to real and personal property, and a holding that there was an implied repeal of the charitable
transfer statutes insofar as they enlarge the common law exemption
of charitable trusts from the common law rule against perpetuities29
would leave Michigan with one rule applicable to charitable trusts of
personalty and another applicable to charitable trusts of realty. 30
To summarize, it seems clear that the new Michigan statute, fairly
construed, will achieve the declared legislative objective of making the
common law rule against perpetuities uniformly applicable to both real
and personal property. However, as we have observed, the new legis23 Mich. Laws (1949) Act 38, §2, 18 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
§26.49(2). For the text of this provision, see note 10, supra.
24 See note 6, supra.
25 People v. Hodgkin, 94 Mich. 27 at 29, 53 N.W. 794 (1892).
26 Mich. Laws (1947) Act 193, 18 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
§26.82(1).
27 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.351 to 554.353, 554.381, 19 Mich. Stat. Ann.
(1937) §§26.1191 to 26.1193, 26.1201.
28 Mich. Laws (1949) Act 38, §2, 18 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
§26.49(2). For the text of this provision, see note 10, supra.
29 For the common law rules with respect to charitable transfers, see 2 SIMES, FUTURB
lNrBRBSTS §§540-49 (1936).
so To the effect that these charitable transfer statutes have enlarged the common law
exemption, see In re Brown's Estate, 198 Mich. 544, 165 N.W. 929 (1917).
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lation has only prospective effect, from which it follows that the old
statutory rules will continue to plague both bench and bar for some
time to come.

B. Indiana
In 1945, after slightly more than a century of experience with
various versions of the New York rule against the suspension of the
absolute power of alienation,31 the Indiana legislature decided to return
to the common law rule against perpetuities.32 The resulting statute
consists in substance of three parts: first, a parapbrase of Professor
Gray's famed statement of the rule; 33 second, a general statement of
intention to adopt the common law rule against perpetuities; and finally,
a repeal of the pre-existing statutory law. 34 This new statute may enjoy,
as does the Michigan statute previously discussed, the advantage that
its repeal provisions will suffice to restore the common law rule against
perpetuities for, prior to the adoption of the old statutory scheme now
repealed, the common law rule was in force in Indiana. 35
It has been observed that the Indiana statute differs from that of
Michigan in that the former attempts to state the common law rule.
Doubtless this attempt will do no harm, inasmuch as substantially the
same statement is found in many cases which purport to declare the
common law rule. But were this brief statutory statement literally
construed and enforced, it would change the common law substantially
since, for example, it contains no exception in the case of contingent
gifts to charity. 36 As a matter of draftsmanship, it may well be asked
why the legislature did not rest with the general statement that it wished
to adopt the common law rule against perpetuities instead of adding an
incomplete definition whicb must be disregarded in order to give effect·
31 For an excellent summary of the New York and Indiana statutory rules, see 4
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, Appendix on the Statutory Rules Against Perpetuities, c. A, c. B,
,r40. For an unqualified denunciation of the Indiana statutory rule, see Leach, "The Rule
Against Perpetuities and the Indiana Perpetuities Statute," 15 hm. L.J. 261 (1940).
32Jnd. Acts (1945) c. 216, §1, IO Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1935, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
§51-105.
33 "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years
after some life in being at the creation of the interest." GRAY, THE RtJLE AGAINST PERPETmTIEs, 3d ed., §201 (1915).
. .
34 Ind. Acts (1945) c. 216, §6, 10 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1935, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
§51-105.
35 Stephens v. Evans' Admx., 30 Ind. 39 (1868).
36 For the common law .rules with respect to charitable gifts, see 2 Sn.ms, FUTURE
INTERESTS §§540-49 (1936).
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to the general expression of intention. 37 The Indiana Appellate Court
has recognized this general intention by dictum.38

C. Wyoming
In 1949, the Wyoming legislature repealed the singularly obscure
statutory rule against perpetuities which had been in force in that state
since 1939,39 replacing it with the Model Rule Against Perpetuities
Act. 40 This statute was drafted by the Commissioners on Uniform
State laws as a model act to be used by any state which might desire·
to abandon its statutory rules and return to the common law rule against
perpetuities. Wyoming is the first state to enact it.
Like the Indiana statute, the Wyoming version attempts an abbreviated statement of the common law rule, modeled after that of Professor Gray,41 and the observations made above with respect to the same
feature of the Indiana legislation are relevant here. One rather unique
feature of the Wyoming statute is the specification that the legislature
intends to adopt the "American common law rule against perpetuities."42 This language apparently means that, where the English rule
differs from the majority view in the United States, the latter is to
prevail, a logical provision from the standpoint ·of the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, but one which may limit the autonomy of the
Wyoming Supreme Court to an undesirable degree with respect to a
few problems. 43 However, the foregoing criticisms are, after all, rather
37 This is largely an academic objection, however. Both Alabama and Ohio have
. statutes which returned them to the common law rule; the former does not attempt a statement of the rule while the latter contains a brief statement, again borrowed from Professor
Gray. Both statutes appear to have accomplished their purpose; see Ala. Code (1940) tit.
47, §16; 7 Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1938) §10512-8.
38 In re Lowe's Estate, 117 Ind. App. 554, 70 N.E. (2d) 187 at 195 (1946).
_aowyo. Laws (1939) c. 92, §1. 4 Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §66-137, which
purports to be the official law of the state, omitted a dependent clause from this statute as
originally enacted in 1939, rendering it meaningless; the original was undesirable enough,
having been originally adopted in the 19th century in Connecticut and Ohio, only to be
repealed. See Conn. Acts and Laws (1784) p. 3 and Conn. Pub. Acts (1895) c. 249,
p. 590; and see 10 Ohio Laws (1811) c. 4, p. 7 and 7 Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1938)
§10512-8.
40Wyo. Laws (1949) c. 92, §1, 4 Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
§66-140; the model statute will be found in 9 Uniform State Laws Ann. (1942, 1950
Cum. Supp.) p. 249.
41 See note 34, supra.
42Wyo. Laws (1949) c. 92, §1, 4 Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
§66-140.
43 For example, there is some authority to the effect that rights of entry are subject to
the common law rule in England, whereas they clearly are not thus limited in the United
States; see 2 S~s, FuTURI! L.'ITERESTS §506 (1936). The lliinois legislature was suffi-
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minor; in general, the Wyoming statute, like those of Michigan and
Indiana, seems entirely adequate to accomplish the legislative purpose.

II
Statutes Which Depart from the Common Law R;,le against
Perpetuities

A. Statutes Undertaki;,,g a General Revision of Perpetuities Law:
The New Pennsylvania Statute
The only statute enacted during the past five years which has
attempted the ambitious task of a general perpetuities revision is the
Pennsylvania Estates Act of 1947.44 There is much to justify the belief
that this statutory scheme has created more serious problems than those
which it attempts to solve; the fundamental departure from the common
law rule against perpetuities is to be found in the following provision
of the statute: "Upon the expiration of the period allowed by the common law rule against perpetuities as measured by actual rather than
possible events any interest not then vested and any interest in members
of a class the membership of which is then subject to increase shall be
void."45 What the italicized language appears to mean is this: "whereas
the common law rule validates only those interests which are sure to
vest, if at all, within lives in being and twenty-one years, we wish to
validate all interests which in fact do vest within lives in being and
twenty-one years, whether they are sure to do so at the time of their
creation or not."
The policy behind this change seems clear enough; the common
law rule lays a trap for the unwary by virtue of its insistence upon
mathematical certainty of vesting, and the legislature was attempting
to improve the common law rule by eliminating the trap. Perhaps the
most common tragedy of this sort is the "unborn widow" case;46 for
ciently dissatisfied with the American common law rule to enact a statute subjecting both
rights of entry and possibilities of reverter to a statutory perpetuities plan. Ill. Laws (1947)
S.B. 347, Ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935, 1949 Cum. Supp.) c. 30, §§37b through 37h.
See p. 1172 infra, for a brief discussion of this Illinois statute; for an exhaustive discussion,
see comment, 43 Ju.. L. REv. 90 (1948).
44 Pa. Laws (1947) Act 39, §§4, 5; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1940, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
tit. 20, §§301.4, 301.5 •.
45 Id., §4(b), §301.4(b). Italics supplied.
46 For example, testator T leaves his estate to son S for life, remainder to S's widow
for life, remainder to the children of S who survive the widow. A recent sample is Perkins
v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 39 A. (2d) 672 (1944).
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others, see Professor Leach's well-known article, "Perpetuities in a
Nutshell." 47 However, the legislature neglected to spell out the precise
form of its new rule against perpetuities; we are told that the interest
is good if it actually does vest within lives in being and twenty-one
years, but this information is useless unless we are also told how to select
the measuring lives. This problem, which the legislators probably
would have dealt with more explicitly had they been aware of its existence, must be dealt with in the conventional phraseology of ''.legislative intent."
·
To begin with, we may lay aside some methods of selection which
clearly will :qot work. Obviously, the legislature did not mean that any
life in being when the interest was created may be a measuring life;
this conclusion would lead to a comic search for century-old lives in
being. And obviously the legislature did not mean that the lives in
being must be a reasonable number, to be specified by the creator of
the interest;48 such a conclusion would invalidate many interests under
the statute which were valid at common law because many transfers
do not specify measuring lives at all, thus requiring an assumption .that
the legislature wished to substitute a new trap for the unwary for that
created by the original common law rule. Nor could the legislators
have intended to employ only those measuring lives which would satisfy the common law rule, for such a conclusion would nullify the
statute completely. This is so because, if common law lives in being
are employed under the statute, the only cases in which a permissible
life in being will be found will be those cases in which the interest
would be valid at common law-in other words, those cases in which
the interest must vest, if at all, within lives in being and twenty-one
years, and the statute clearly contemplates that interests shall be valid
if they do in fact vest within twenty-one years after the termination of
the measuring lives.
If there is to be a satisfactory solution to the problem of selecting
measuring lives under this statu_te, perhaps it lies in some such approach
as this: a life in being at the creation of the interest may be a measuring
life for purposes of the Pennsylvania statute if said life is either expressly or impliedly referred to in the instrument creating the interest. Or,
in other words, those lives in being which are related to the happening
of the conditions precedent to the vesting of the interest may be meas47 51 HARv. L. R:Ev. 638 (1938).
48 Some such suggestion as this appears

(1948).

in a note, 97

UNIV. PA.

L. R:Ev. 263 at 267
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uring lives, such lives being either expressly or impliedly referred to in
the instrument.
Of course this criterion is too slippery to be entirely satisfactory,
but half a loaf is better than none. For purposes of illustration, let us
take two transfers, one,involving express reference and the other involving implied reference to the measuring lives. For the first, we may
use the "unborn widow" case: testator T transfers property to son S for
life, remainder to those children of S who survive his widow. We may
suppose three possibilities: (I) Sis survived by a widow who was in
being at T's death and eventually she dies, leaving surviving children of
S; under our statutory test, the remainder is valid because it did in fact
vest within twenty-one years after the death of the widow-she can be
a measuring life since she is expressly referred to in the instrument as
a life in being which must terminate as a condition precedent to the
vesting of the remainder. (2) Sis survived by a widow unborn at T's
death and she dies more than twenty-one years after S's death, leaving
surviving children of S; our statutory test invalidates this remainder,
there being no life in being expressly or impliedly referred to in the
instrument which did in fact terminate within twenty-one years prior
to the vesting of the remainder. (3) Suppose the same situation as (2),
but the widow dies one week after S dies; under our statutory test, this
remainder is valid since it did in fact terminate within twenty-one years
after the death of S, a life in being expressly referred to in the instrument, the termination of which is a condition precedent to the vesting
of the remainder. Let us now try a case involving implied reference to
measuring lives: testator T transfers property to those grandchildren of
A who attain the age of twenty-one, A being alive at T's death. At
common law, this interest is of course invalid because of the possibility
of after-born children of A. For purposes of our statutory tes~, we may
suppose two possibilities: (1) A dies leaving surviving children, all of
whom were in being at T's death, and there are grandchildren of A
who attain the age of twenty-one; here the interest is valid since the
children of A are measuring lives, A's children being impliedly referred
to in the instrument because they must give birth to the grandchildren
as a condition precedent to the vesting of the interest in the grandchildren; (2) A dies leaving surviving children, one of whom was born
after T's death, but the grandchildren who attain the age of twenty-one
are all born of children of A who were in being at T's death and A's
after-born child is the first child of A to die; again the interest is valid,
A's children who were alive at T's death again being the lives in being.
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Of course, there is no express sanction in the statutory language for
any such limitation upon permissible measuring lives as that which has
been suggested; furthermore, it is not asserted that this limitation will
solve all measuring lives problems under the Pennsylvania statute. It
is merely suggested that this limitation is a device whereby the legislative purpose in enacting the statute might be effectuated.
The next problem to be faced is, how does the Pennsylvania statute's vest-in-fact test affect interests which have no relation to measuring
lives? Under the common law rule against perpetuities, such interests
are invalid unless they must vest if at all within twenty-one years
after their creation. The substitution of the statutory test would seem
to require the validation of such interests if they actually do vest within
twenty-one years, requiring a waiting period of that length in order to
resolve the matter. 49
We now come to the provision of the Pennsylvania statute which
deals with class gifts; the statute provides that, upon the expiration of
the measuring period, "... any interest not then vested and any_ interest
in members of a class the membership of which is subject to increase
shall be void."50 A fair construction of this language in the light of its
legislative history5 1 leads one to the conclusion that the legislature
merely intended a codification of the common law rules relating to class
gifts, as modified of course by the vest-in-fact test previously discussed. 52
For example, suppose a transfer to A for life, remainder to those children of A who graduate from law school, A being alive when the transfer was made, but having since deceased leaving three surviving children, all of whom were born after the transfer and only one of whom
had finished law school twenty-one years after A's death. Under the
statute, assuming for the sake of what we may doubtfully call simplicity
49 Of course, the vest-in-fact approach of the statute will require a waiting period in
any case, whether there are measuring lives involved or not; for a highly entertaining and
informative article, arguing that the imposition of such a waiting period is undesirable, see
Phipps, "The Pennsylvania Experiment in Perpetuities," 23 TEMPLE L.Q. 20 (1948).
50 Pa. Laws (1947) Act 39, §4(b), Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1940, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
tit. 20, §301.4(b).
51 The drafting commission's comment appears in Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1940, 1949
Cum. Supp.) tit. 20 in a footnote to §301.4: "Gifts to a class, the membership of which
is still subject to increase at the expiration of the period, are treated in the same manner as
contingent interests although there may have been a technical vesting in some of the
members. This is in accord with the common law which invalidates the entire class gift
if the class will not be closed within the period. See SIMES, FUTtIIU! hmmEsTS, Sections
498 and 499."
52 The vest-in-fact test will validate many class gifts which were invalid at common
law because mathematical certainty of vesting is no longer required.
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that our formula for selection of measuring lives will be given effect
by the Pennsylvania courts, it is clear that the remainder to the child
who has graduated has vested within the permissible measuring period;
· but it is equally clear that the remainders to the other two children have
not so vested. Under the statutory language above quoted, the entire
remainder would seem to be void since, at the termination of the measuring period, the membership of the class is still subjeGt to increase-.
the two children of A who have not yet graduated from law school may
yet do so. 53 Thus construed, the above-quoted language is merely a
codification of the well-known doctrine of Leake 11. Robinson54 which
prohibits• the splitting of a class so as to hold a gift valid as to some
members and invalid as to others. 55
Finally, the Pennsylvania statute makes some changes in the common law with respect to the effect of the invalidity of an interest.56
Presumably these· changes were made on the hypothesis that they will
be more likely to effectuate the transferor's intent than were the common law rules. 57
~
·

B. Statutes Modifying the Pre-Existing Law with Respect to Speci-fic
Problems
I. Alabama
In 1949, the Alabama legislature enacted a statute relating to insurance trusts58 which in substance provides as follows: for purposes of
53 The reader may be wondering at this point what would happen in our hypothetical
case if the child who did graduate from law school within 21 years after A's death had
been in being when the transfer was made, the question being: can this child be a measuring
life so as to validate the gifts to 'A's two other children if the latter two graduate from law
school within 21 years after the death of the former? Under the express or implied reference
test previously suggested as a criterion for selecting measuring lives under the Pennsylvania
statute, the answer would seem to be yes. This child of A is a life in being, expressly referred
to in the instrument, whose graduation from law school is a condition precedent to the
vesting of the transferred interest:
54 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817).
55 See 2 SIMEs, Funnra lNTEREsTs §§526-28 (1936) •
. 56 Pa. Laws (1947) Act 39, §5, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1940, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
tit. 20, §301.5: "(a) A valid interest following a void interest in income shall be accelerated
to the termination date of the last preceding valid interest. (b) A void interest following a
valid interest on condition subsequent or special limitation shall vest in the owner of such
valid interest. (c) Any other void interest shall vest in the person or persons entitled to
the income at the expiration of the period described in section 4(b)." For the common law
rules as to the effect of invalidity, see 2 SIMEs, Funnra INTEREsTs §§520, 529-33 (1936);
3 SxMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §§768-72 (1936). The drafting commission's comment on
these changes appears in Pa. Stat. Ann. (Piµdon, 1940, 1949 Cum. Supp.) tit. 20 in a
footnote to §301.5. For a brief discussion of the above-quoted statutory language, see note,
97 UNIV. PA. L. Rllv. 263 at 266-67 (1948).
57 The comment of the drafting commission so indicates; see Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
1940, 1949 Cum. Supp.) tit. 20, footnote to §301.5.
58 Ala. Acts (1949) Act 265. ·
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applying the common law rule against perpetuities or the pre-1931
Alabama statutory rule, 59 any unfunded insurance trust consisting of
life, health, accident or disability insurance policies shall be regarded
as created when the liability of the insurer accrues because of the happening of the event insured against.
To what extent does this statute change the common law? Quite
independent of the rule against perpetuities, if it be regarded as providing that an unfunded insurance trust is not a present trust, the
statute has embraced a discredited view. 60 At least this is true insofar
as the statute deals with unfunded life insurance trusts and there would
seem to be no reason for distinguishing life, health, accident and disability insurance trusts for this purpose other than the uniformly rejected argument that a life insurance trust is testamentary. 61
It seems more likely that the Alabama legislature does regard the
unfunded insurance trust as a present trust and merely intended to
provide that, in applying rules against perpetuities to such trusts, the
period of the rule should be measured from the happening of the event
rather than from the creation of the trust. Again assuming the equivalence of the unfunded life insurance trust with the other varieties
mentioned in the statute, it appears that this statute has codified the
common law in part and departed from it in part. Where the settlorinsured of an unfunded life insurance trust has reserved a power to
revoke the trust and to change beneficiaries, there is authority that the
period of the common law rule against perpetuities is to be measured
from the death of the insured, 62 and the more recent writers are in
accord with this view. 63 On the other hand, where an unfunded life
insurance trust is irrevocable and there is a renunciation of power to
change beneficiaries, it seems fairly clear that the common rule against
59 The statute literally refers to " ... any law against perpetuities or suspension of
the power of alienation of title to property." Ala. Acts (1949) c. 265, but it seems clear
that the legislature was referring to the former Alabama statutory rule applicable to interests
in land, Ala. Civ. Code of 1923, §6922, rather than the more common statutory rule against
suspension of the absolute power of alienation, 4 PROPERTY RBsTATBMBNT, App'endix on
The Statutory Rules Against Perpetuities (1940), for the latter has never been law in
Alabama. The Alabama statutory rule was repealed in 1931 by General Acts of Alabama,
Act 684, Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 47, §16 which re-enacted the common law rule as
to real property.
60 SMITH, PERSONAL LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS §§13-16 (1950).
61 Id., §17.
62 Mfgr's. Life Ins. Co. v. The von Hamm-Young Co., Ltd., 34 Hawaii 288 (1937).
63 Morris, "The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Living Trusts and Living
Life Insurance Trusts," 11 Umv. Cm. L. RBv. 327 (1937); SMITH, PERSONAL LIFE
INsURANCB TRUSTS §34.2 (1950). Contra: Phillips, ''Life Insurance Trusts: A Recapitulation for the Draftsman," 81 Umv. PA. L. RBv. 284 at 293 (1933).
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perpetuities is _to be applied as of the creation of the trust. 64 Where
the degree of control retained by the settlor-insured lies between the
above extremes, the safest generalization is that the law is unsettled. 65
As to the desirability of this new statute, at least it can be said that
it settles a controversial point of law in a field which has become increasingly important in recent years. Absent such a statute, a careful
draftsman would probably so design an insurance trust as to render it
valid even though the applicable rule against perpetuities were applied
as of the creation of the trust. 66 However, it must be recognized that
the net effect of the statute is to permit an inter vivos settlor to create
contingent interests of greater duration via an unfunded insurance
trust than is possible by any other method. Whether such a gratuitous
boon to the insurance salesman is justifiable might be questioned.
2. Illinois
Despite the protests of various legal writers, denouncing rights of
entry and possibilities of reverter as stumbling blocks in the path of full
utilization of land,67 it is well settled, at least in the United States, that
the common law rule against perpetuities does not apply to rights of
entry and possibilities of reverter. 68
In 1947, the Illinois legislature decided to impose limitations upon
the permissible duration of these interests. 69 The nub of this statutory
plan is contained in section 4 of the s·tatute, 70 which, in general, places
a fifty-year limitation upon the duration of such interests, provides that
if such an interest is created to endure for a longer period it shall be
valid for fifty years, and further provides that the statute shall apply to
interests previously created as well as those created subsequently.
4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §374, comment c (1940) .
S:MITH, PERSONAL LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS §34.3 (1950) contains a discussion
of the possibilities.
•
·
.
66 Leach, "Perpetuities in a Nutshell," as appearing in Appendix II of SHATTUCK,
AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 405 (1948).
67 Goldstein, ''Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the
Use of Land," 54 HARv. L. REv. 248 at 250--54 and 271-72 (1940).
68 2 S1MEs, FuTUR.E lNTER.EsTs §§506-07 (1936).
69 ill. Laws (1947) S.B. 347, ID. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
c. 30, §§37b thiough 37h.
70 "Neither possibilities of reverter nor rights of entry or re-entry for breach of condition
subsequent, whether heretofore or hereafter created, where the condition has not been broken,
shall be valid for a longer period than fifty years from the date of the creation of the condition
or possibility of reverter." ID. Laws (1947) S.B. 247, §4, ID. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd,
1935, 1949 Cum. Supp.) c. 30, §37e. For a detailed examination of the entire statute with
reference to lliinois law, see comment, 43 ILL. L. REv. 90 (1948).
64
• 65
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The attempt to apply the statute to pre-existing interests is, of
course, open to some question on due process grounds,71 and yet a
statute having only prospective effect would leave the current problem
created by such interests entirely unsolved. Further due processs questions are raised by differences in the applicable statutes of limitations
which result in some rather arbitrary distinctions. For example, section
5 of the statute72 provides that, if a determinable fee was created more
than fifty years prior to the enactment of the statute and terminated
prior to the enactment of the statute, any action to recover the land must
be brought within one year from the effective date of the act. On the
other hand, consistently with the statutory language, if a determinable
fee were created forty-nine years before the enactment of the statute
and terminated within one year after its enactment, an action to recover
the land might be brought at any time within the succeeding seven
years or twenty years. 73 Thus the legislature is more rigorous in its
treatment of determinable fees which have terminated prior to the
enactment of the statute than in dealing with those which terminate
subsequently, a rather unusual approach.
Another distinction which the legislature has drawn is rather hard
to justify at first glance. The new statute applies only to those rights of
entry in which the condition remains unbroken for fifty years. 74 Hence
the statute imposes no apparent limitation upon the duration of a right
of entry wherein the condition has been broken within fifty years after
its creation, but the owner of the right has neglected to elect between
forfeiture of the estate and waiver of forfeiture. 75 What limitations are
imposed upon the duration of such a right of entry by statutes of limitations? By the literal terms of the applicable Illinois statute, the permissible duration may be either seven or twenty years. 76 Hence the
result is reached that a right of entry may exist under Illinois law for a
maximum period of fifty years if the condition remains unbroken, but
if the condition is broken, the right may remain for a total period of a
71

For a discussion of this problem, see comment, 43 ILL. L. REv. 90 (1948).
ill. Laws (1947) S.B. 347, §5, ID. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
c. 30, §37f.
73 In such a case, the grantor or his heirs hold a fee simple, not a possibility of reverter,
2 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §239 comment g (1940). The period of limitation is seven
or twenty years, depending on the nature of the adverse possession. ID. Laws (1871-72)
pp. 556-57, §§1, 6, ID. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935, 1949 Cum. Supp.) c. 83, §§1, 6.
74 See the statutory language, note 70, supra.
·
751 Su.ms, FUTURE INTErulsTs §170 (1936).
1a ID. Laws (1871-72) pp. 556-57, §§1, 3 Fourth and 6, ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd,
1935) c. 83, §§1, 3 Fourth and 6.
12
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little less than fifty-seven or seventy years. It would seem that the cloud
upon title would be the same whether the condition had been broken
or not. However, a plausible explanation for this distinction may be
found in the justifiable desire of the legislature to make the statute
retroactively applicable. With an eye upon constitutional difficulties,
the legislators might well be more careful in dealing with a right of
entry wherein the condition has been broken since this is the more
susbtantial property interest.
On the whole, the problem of the duration'. of these interests would
appear to be a difficult one to solve by the enactment of perpetuities
statutes, though it is difficult to quarrel with the legislative objective.

3. Minnesota
Minnesota is one of eleven states which have statutory perpetuities
rules modeled more or less after the original New York statutes of 1830;77
in Minnesota, the statutory rule is confined to interests in real property
and chattels real. 78 In 1947, th·e Minnesota legislature repealed the
·sections of the real property statutes dealing with estates for life·and
altered the section dealing with chattels real so as to render the language
consistent with the remaining real property sections. 79
The repealed sections have been roundly denounced by Dean
Fraser80 as creating needless complications. The result of their repeal
will be to leave the creation of life estates subject to the same general
limitation against suspension of the absolute power of alienation for
more than two lives in being at the creation of the interest which is
imposed upon the creation of other interests in real property and chattels real by the Minnesota statutes.81 Certainly any steps in the direction of uniformity in perpetuities law are to be applauded, but it will
be observed that Minnesota still has one rule against perpetuities applicable to personal property and another for interests in realty and chat77 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, Appendix on the Statutory Rules Against Perpetuities,
Intro. Note (1940). The Restatement lists 13 such states, but Indiana and Michigan must
now be subtracted from the list, see this comment, supra.
78 28 Mµm. Stat. Ann. (1947) §§500.11 through 500.13.
79 Minn. Laws (1947) c. 207, §§1, 2, 28 Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947, 1949 Cum. Supp.)
§500.13, §§3-6.
so "No one has ever succeeded in giving a good reason for these restrictions, not
even the New York revisors who drafted them. They serve no useful purpose, and their
results are generally absurd." Fraser, "Future Interests, Uses and Trusts," 28 Minn. Stat.
Ann. (1947) 54 at 84. For a discussion of these provisions, see Fraser, "Suspension of the
Power of Alienation," 8 Mnm. L. REv. 295 at 310-16 (1924).
81Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §§500.13, §§1, 2.
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tels real,82 a situation found to be undesirable in Michigan,83 and one
which has apparently caused no· little confusion in Minnesota with
respect to trusts of real estate.84 It is to be hoped that the Minnesota
legislature will soon take further steps in the direction of uniformity
in the law as to perpetuiti~.

4. Statutes Exempting Employees' Pension Trusts and Analogous
Trusts from the Operation of Rules against Perpetuities
Professor Simes pointed out a few years ago85 that an increasing
number of jurisdictions were enacting statutes exempting pension trusts
and similar trusts from the operation of rules against perpetuities. This
trend has continued during the past five years, ten states having enacted
statutes dealing with this problem.86
Some of these statutes exempt only trusts of personalty from the ·
operation of perpetuities rules,87 while others exempt such trusts
whether they be of real .or personal property. 88 Of course there are
potential problems involved in having different perpetuities rules applicable to trusts of real and personal property. 89 But query as to the
82 Id., §§1, 2 and 7. The common law rule against perpetuities is in force in Minnesota
with respect to interests in personal property other than chattels real. In re Tower's Estate,
49 Minn. 371, 52 N.W. 27 (1892); 4 PRoPER'l'Y RESTATEMENT, Appendix on the Statutory
Rules Against Perpetuities c. B, '1[59 (1940). But compare Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §501.11.
ss See this comment, supra, for a discussion of the recent Michigan statute restoring
the common law rule as to real property and chattels real.
84 In re Tower's Estate, 49 Minn. 371, 52 N.W. 27 (1892); Fraser, "The Rules
Against Restraints on Alienation and Against Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation
in Minnesota: III, Their Application to Trusts," 9 MINN. L. REv. 314 at 339-52 (1925).
85 Simes, "Trusts and Estates-Trends in the Law: 1941-1945," 44 Mrca. L. REv. 833
at 837 (1946).
86 Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
York, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
87Del. Laws (1945) c. 224, §1; Wis. Laws (1945-46) c. 553, 2 Wis. Stats. (1947)
§272.18 (31) (b); Mich. Laws (1947) Act 193, 18 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937, 1949 Cum.
Supp.) §26.82(1).
88 Ala. Gen. Acts (1945) Act 306, Ala. Code (1940, 1949 Cum. Supp.) tit. 47, §152(1);
Cal. Codes, Statutes and Amendments (1945) c. 1035, §9, Cal. Code Ann., Corp. (Deering,
1948, 1949 Cum. Supp.) §28004; New York, having previously had a statute applicable
only to personal property, N.Y. Laws (1928) c. 173, Personal Property §l3(c), has now
enacted a statute applicable to trusts of real estate as well. N.Y. Laws (1946) c. 701, Real
Property §42-a. Several states have enacted statutes which do not expressly distinguish
between realty and personalty and hence probably apply to both: Conn. Laws (1947)
Pub. Act No. 81, 3 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §6898; ill. Laws (1945) S.B. 425; Mass. Acts
& Resolves (1946) c. 287, 6 Mass. Ann. Laws (1933, 1949 Cum. Supp.) c. 203, §3 A;
Pa. Laws (1947) Act 210, §4, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1940: 1949 Cum. Supp.) tit. 20,

POlA.

.

so For example, in Michigan when the common.law rule was in force as to personalty ·
while a statutory rule was in force as to realty and chattels real, the court held a trust
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likelihood that such a trust for the benefit of employees will contain
realty?
Presumably no one would quarrel with the exemption of these
trusts from rules against perpetuities. Employees' trust programs, if
they are to be efficiently administered, probably should make provision
for future employees. These future beneficial interests are necessarily
contingent and are by no means certain to vest within any particular
period, nor can such trusts properly be termed charitable so as to benefit
from this exception to the common law rule against perpetuities. 90 On
the whole, these statutes appear to be the most satisfactory solution to
the problem.

III
Conclusions
While the legislation which we have been reviewing is rather
diverse, a few general conclusions are possible. In the first place, the
general trend seems to be away from the various statutory substitutes
for the common law rule against perpetuities as a basic approach to the
problem of limiting the duration of indirect restraints upon the alienation of property. The reason for this is not difficult to visualize; as of
1944, there were thirty-two states in which the common law rule
against perpetuities was in force without substantial statutory modification. 91 The net result of this is a wealth of case law exploring the various aspects of the rule and, a fortiori, a definite rule in a field of law
where definiteness is at a premium. Secondly, we have in these recent
statutes, particularly in that of Pennsylvania, pointed illustrations of the
difficulties which confront a draftsman who seeks to devise a workable
substitute for the common law rule. The attempt by the New York
draftsmen in the Revised Statutes of 183092 has been the most popular
effort9 3 but as we have observed, Michigan and Indiana have now
consisting of some $800 worth of realty and some $56,000 worth of personalty invalid
because it violated the statutory rule. In re Richard's Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W.
657 (1938). For a discussion of the recent Michigan statute abolishing the statutory rule,
see this comment, supra.
oo For the common law exception, see 2 S1MEs, FUTURE lNrnREsTs §§540-50 (1936).
014 PROPERTY REsTATEl\mNT, Appendix on The Statutory Rules Against Perpetuities,
Intro. Note (1940). To this list we may now add Indiana, Michigan and Wyoming, but
we must subtract Pennsylvania. With respect to the current law of these four states, see
this comment, supra.
92New York Rev. Stat. 1830.
93 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, Appendix on The Statutory Rules Against Perpetuities,
Intro. Note (1940) lists 13 states which had adopted all or part of the New York statutory
scheme as of 1944; from thµ; list, Indiana and Michigan must now be subtracted, see this
comment, supra.
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returned to the common law fold, and the New York statutory rule has
been severely criticized. 94 Finally, we have observed that some narrower statutory modifications of the common law rule appear to be
quite clear and workable.
Despite Professor Leach's beatific comment on the rule, 95 we need
not conclude from the foregoing that general statutory revisions of the
law of perpetuities are doomed to failure, embracing the common law
rule as a timeless answer to the perpetuities problem. In the light of
the statutes which we have examined, however, it seems safe to observe
that the draftsman who would revise the law of perpetuities successfully
must be a very able and a very lucid man.

Thomas L. Waterbury, S.Ed.

9 4 Professor Gray, in his famed work on the rule against perpetuities, has this to say
of the New York rule: " •.. in no civilized country is the making of a will so delicate an
operation and so likely to fail of success as in New York." GRAY, THE RuLB AGAINST
PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §750 (1915). Professor Leach, in speaking before the Indiana
State Bar Association regarding the Indiana version of the New York statutes, remarked that
the Indiana statutes omitted some of the New York provisions and then declared: ''But
they have all of the difficulties in application which have driven New York lawyers and
judges nearly mad for about a hundied years." Leach, "The Rule Against Perpetuities
and the Indiana Perpetuities Statute," 15 Ind. L.J. 261 at 263 (1940). For one who pines
for a return to the New York statutory scheme, see Sherrard, "Perpetuities in Michigan
Today," 29 Mich. State B.J., March, 1950, p. 5.
95 "The Rule Against Perpetuities is the sanctum sanclorum of the law, complete with
its bearded and incomparable high priest, John Chipman Gray, and a coterie of acolytes.
The Rule is all things to all men ... to the troubled spirit, a blessed sheltering realization
that lives-in-being-and-twenty-one-years have the same validity after two world wars and
four Democratic administrations that they had when Queen Victoria ascended the throne."
Leach, "Perpetuities in a Nutshell," as appearing in Appendix II of SHATTUCK, AN EsTATE
PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 373 (1948).

